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Globalising Cartography? The International Map of the 
World, the International Geographical Union, and the United 
Nations 
 
Abstract Few maps mirror the history of the twentieth century as 
closely as the International Map of the World (IMW). A proposal for a 
map of the entire globe on a scale of 1:1 million, using standard 
conventions and symbols, was presented at the Fifth International 
Geographical Congress (IGC) in Berne in 1891 by the German 
geographer Albrecht Penck. Over two decades later, the final 
specification was finally published shortly before the outbreak of World 
War One, a crisis that brought a halt to the international collaboration 
on which the project depended. The IMW’s fortunes waxed and waned 
over the next three decades, necessitating a  major review of its 
continuing value after World War Two. A new IMW Executive 
Commission under the chairmanship of John Kirtland Wright, Director 
of the American Geographical Society (AGS), was established at the 
1949 Lisbon conference of the International Geographical Union (IGU). 
Drawing on Wright’s correspondence in the AGS archives, this paper 
examines the debates between the national cartographic agencies and 
related societies involved in this project about the future of the IMW, 
with particular reference to the transfer of the project’s Central Bureau 
from the British Ordnance Survey in Southampton to the United 
Nations (UN) in New York in the early 1950s. This discussion, which 
focused mainly on the need to combine the IMW with an 
internationalised version of the US-dominated 1:1 million World 
Aeronautical Chart, reveals the on-going tensions between the ideals of 
scientific internationalism embodied in the IMW’s original proposal and 
the harsh realities of national self-interest in the early years of the Cold 
War. 
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Introduction 
The International Map of the World (IMW), otherwise known as the Carte du 
Monde au Millionième, had a prolonged gestation period and a protracted, 
inconclusive demise. The idea was first proposed by the German geographer 
Albrecht Penck at the Fifth International Geographical Congress (IGC) in 
Bern in 1891 (Figure 1). Penck’s proposal envisaged a genuinely co-operative 
international map at the million scale, based on a common set of symbols 
and conventions. This would help resolve the bewildering complexity of the 
existing cartographic archive, the result of centuries of mutually 
antagonistic map-making by rival nations and empires. An IMW would have 
enormous scientific and educational value, Penck claimed, and would 
diminish the defensive territoriality on which existing cartography had 
previously been founded. It would create a new cartographic image of the 
whole earth at the dawn of a new century - a common map for a common 
humanity that would allow scientists and students alike to establish 
meaningful, world-wide comparisons for the first time.1  
Penck’s vision was warmly received and a special committee established 
during the Bern Congress comprising twenty members from ten countries, 
including, alongside Penck himself, Ferdinand von Richthofen, Eduard 
Brückner, Alexander Supan, John Scott Keltie, Ernst G. Ravenstein, Franz 
Schrader and John Wesley Powell.2 Penck recognized that if the IMW was to 
succeed, it would need to accommodate demands much wider than those 
expressed by an inherently more internationalist scientific community. 
Traditional geopolitical concerns and ambitions had also to be 
acknowledged. In an attempt to persuade his British colleagues, for 
example, that an  international mapping project posed no threat to the 
imperial ideals that had previously shaped so much of their cartographic 
work around the world, Penck insisted that: 
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The circumstances and interests of our civilised life make good maps 
almost a necessity. Maps of our own country are absolutely 
indispensable; commercial interests, missionary undertakings, and 
colonial enterprise create a demand for maps of foreign countries, while 
of the maps required for educational purposes and as illustrations of 
contemporary history, the name is legion… A uniform map of the world 
would be at the same time a uniform map of the British Empire showing 
not only the actual territory under British authority, but also the sphere 
of British commercial activity, and would serve the varied purposes of 
administration, navigation, and commerce.3 
Despite the best efforts of Penck and the IMW Commission, relatively 
few government authorities were ready to cooperate on an international map 
project and many refused to participate in any of the proposed meetings.4 
The whole idea began to founder. Resolutions approved at the Sixth IGC in 
London in 1895 were rejected by French geographers at the Seventh IGC in 
Berlin on the grounds that Paris rather than Greenwich had been adopted 
as the prime meridian. Likewise, and in response, British geographers 
objected to the use of the metric system cherished by French map-makers.  
While the geographers procrastinated, the official mapping agencies in 
Italy, France, Great Britain and Germany recognized the practical value of 
Penck’s idea and began to prepare official map series of foreign territories at 
the million scale. The Survey of India commenced a new series on “India and 
adjacent countries” at 1:1 million scale in 1904. Whilst these new initiatives 
were clearly inspired by the IMW and demonstrated the value of the million 
scale, they also exposed the very national inconsistencies in map design that 
the IMW was intended to overcome (Figures 2 and 3).  
Penck used these examples at the Eighth IGC in Washington DC to 
urge the US Government to produce a general 1:1 million map of the United 
States using a uniform set of symbols and conventional signs based on a 
polyconic projection with Greenwich as the prime meridian and the metre as 
the standard unit of measurement. Henry Gannett, the official Geographer 
at United States Geological Survey (USGS) was put in charge of the 
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preparatory work.5 The Ninth IGC in Geneva in 1908 received Gannett’s 
recommendations for the standardization of the map with enthusiasm. 
Gannett had employed hypsometric colour tints for depicting relief, an 
increasingly popular method employed already by such organisations as the 
Survey of India on their million-scale mapping.        
For seventeen years, congress succeeded congress and resolution 
succeeded resolution but very little was achieved towards the actual 
production of the map.6 Until the various governments and their official 
mapping agencies lent their practical support there would be little prospect 
of success. It was Charles Arden Close, chief of the Geographical Section of 
General Staff (GSGS) and later Director-General of the Ordnance Survey, 
who suggested to the IGC in Geneva in 1908 that the British government 
should be approached to organise an official conference in London to which 
government representatives would be invited.7 This was a particularly 
attractive proposition given that Britain and its overseas empire would 
necessarily contribute the largest share, approximately 25 per cent, of the 
proposed IMW sheets. 
The First International Map Conference took place at the British 
Foreign Office on the 16 November 1909. Although guiding principles had 
been agreed at previous IGCs, Sir Charles Hardinge, the British Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, pointed out that up to this point these 
agreements “partook somewhat of the nature of pious aspirations”.8 
Representatives from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Spain and the United States hammered out a set of more precise resolutions 
that were finally adopted unanimously (Plate 1).  
It was agreed that the IMW would use a simple polyconic projection at a 
scale of 1:1 million with Greenwich as the prime meridian.9 An ingenious 
and innovative global system of sheet numbering was also introduced with 
the metre adopted as the standard unit of measurement.10 Each sheet would 
cover six degrees of longitude and four degrees of latitude (Plate 2). Latin 
characters would be used on all official sheets. Countries could publish 
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sheets using alternative scripts for national editions but would be expected 
to publish the international sheet using Latin script.11  
Perhaps the key underlying principle of the IMW project was that 
sovereign states should prepare and publish map sheets solely of their own 
territories wherever possible. The IMW Committee would not recognize 
national sheets published by cartographic agencies, whether private or 
public, that mapped the territories of other states using IMW conventions, 
unless those states lacked adequate cartographic capacity of their own and 
had formally invited external mapping agencies to undertake this task on 
their behalf.  
This principle became the Achilles heel of the project. Even during the 
deliberations at the Paris International Map Conference of 1913 prior to 
publication of the final specification, Russia and Japan contested the right 
to make million-scale sheets of China, leading Arthur Hinks, the combative 
Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society in London, to note:  
a Chinese Secretary of Legation, to the admiration of all hearers, 
declared that he was authorized by his Government to announce that 
Geodetic and Topographical Services were now operating regularly in all 
the provinces of China. So there was nothing for Russia and Japan to do 
in the matter.12 
While the IMW Committee were fully aware that parallel projects would 
make an important contribution to million-scale mapping, it could not 
endorse them for fear of alienating other contributing states.  
The hard negotiations were now complete and at the Second 
International Map Conference in Paris in December 1913 delegates from 35 
countries confirmed the final specifications and established a Central 
Bureau at the Ordnance Survey’s Southampton headquarters to facilitate 
the exchange of information between the contributing national cartographic 
agencies (Plate 3).13 After 22 years of negotiation, the foundation was set for 
the most ambitious mapping project ever undertaken. However, it was a sad 
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irony that the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 shattered these 
carefully constructed compromises.  
 
 
The IMW from the 1920s to the 1940s 
The major mapping agencies turned their attention to larger-scale map 
production during the First World War but the IMW survived in various 
guises. Around one hundred 1:1 million sheets were prepared at the Royal 
Geographical Society under the auspices of GSGS during the war.14 This 
simplified version of the IMW was selected as an approved map series for the 
post-war Peace Conference and its usefulness for several different national 
delegations strengthened the case for continuing the IMW after 1918.15 
Many newly created countries established at the Paris Peace Conferences 
signed up to the IMW. Forty-four nations had committed themselves to the 
conventions by 1926, by which time more than 200 sheets had been 
published, though only a half were consistent with the 1913 resolutions and 
only 21 conformed exactly.16  
Progress on the IMW between the wars was dictated by the economic, 
military and political interests of participating nation states. The mapping of 
Africa was largely divided up amongst the European colonial powers and 
progressed steadily, though with various levels of modification to the original 
specification. In Paris, the Service Géographique de l'Armée had prepared a 
series of its own 1:1 million European sheets during World War One and 
this new coverage was extended to the French colonies in North Africa after 
1918.17 Due to the paucity of source material, the first edition of France’s 
African series, published in 1924, carried the provisional title ‘Croquis du 
Sahara et des Régions Limitrophes 1:1,000,000’. The series expanded 
through the late 1920s and 1930s to include Equatorial Africa and by 1939 
consisted of 54 sheets under the revised, but still provisional title of ‘Croquis 
du Sahara Français’.  
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Sheets conforming closely to the Paris conventions were published 
outside the auspices of the IMW. The Brazilian Club de Engenharia 
published a 50-sheet series in 1922 entitled ‘Carta do Brazil’ to celebrate the 
centenary of Brazilian independence.18 Based on the 1909 conventions, the 
series demonstrated the potential of million-scale mapping, even if 
unexplored areas were necessarily subject to the creativity of the 
cartographer’s imagination. Countries took it upon themselves to extend 
million-scale mapping projects beyond the borders of their own sovereign 
territories. Germany, in a manoeuvre freighted with geopolitical significance, 
extended its coverage to include all German-speaking territories in Europe.19 
The finest example of a million-scale mapping project informed by, but 
independent of, the IMW was undoubtedly the American Geographical 
Society’s (AGS) ‘Map of Hispanic America on the Millionth Scale’, initiated by 
the Society’s influential director Isaiah Bowman. When all 107 sheets were 
completed in 1945, it was rightly judged as an unsurpassed scientific and 
artistic achievement.20 
Even at this early stage, however, there were several notable 
absentees from the IMW project which had a major debilitating effect on 
IMW progress. Though the Tsarist government in Russia was originally a 
member, the Bolshevik authorities withdrew their support after the 1917 
revolution.21 Furthermore, just four North American sheets had been 
published by the mid-1920s as a consequence of the virtual withdrawal of 
the United States from the IMW after 1913, despite the enthusiastic and 
practical assistance of several American cartographers during the early 
phase of the project.22 This reflected traditional isolationist American 
hostility to ‘entangling alliances’, as much of a concern in respect of 
scientific collaboration as it was for diplomatic relations. But American 
inactivity was also a consequence of the absence of a single co-ordinating 
civilian mapping agency that could meaningfully represent the United States 
within such a project.23 Furthermore, the Geological Survey of the 
Department of the Interior and the Coast and Geodetic Survey of the 
Department of Commerce concentrated their energies on mapping at scales 
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larger than 1:1 million as more than five-eighths of the country had no 
topographic mapping. Elsewhere, an absence of accurate compilation 
material, technical resources, and (in some cases) political uncertainty 
meant that no significant progress had yet been made on sheets for north-
east Asia, China, Australia, South Africa, Canada, and Polynesia (Plate 4).24  
The remarkable progress made by national agencies operating outside 
of the IMW strengthened the arguments of the IMW’s critics such as Hinks 
who believed only the independent national agencies of the leading powers 
were capable of mapping the world as a whole:  
The moral seems to be that if you want a general map covering a continent, 
consistent in style, and available in quantity, you must make it yourself, and 
whether you call it International or not is a matter of choice, or expediency, or 
perhaps of chance.25  
The spirit of international co-operation survived, however, in the idea to 
prepare a map series of the Roman Empire at the 1:1 million scale, first 
proposed at the 1928 IGC meeting in Cambridge (England) by O. G. S. 
Crawford, the Ordnance Survey’s Archaeology Officer, a position created 
especially for him by Arden-Close. The International Map of the Roman 
Empire (officially entitled the ‘Tabula Imperii Romani’ from 1934) was 
specifically designed as a IMW-related project and aimed to publish a series 
of sheets showing Roman archaeological remains across Europe, North 
Africa and the Middle East. Crawford’s objectives were partly political, 
shaped by strongly held Marxist convictions and his associated concerns 
about the manipulation and politicisation of Roman archaeology for 
nationalist purposes in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.26 In 1935, a 
conference at the Royal Geographical Society recommended that the IMW 
Central Bureau should assume a co-ordinating responsibility for the Map of 
the Roman Empire and re-confirmed the latter’s status as an official IMW 
project (Figure 4). Further resolutions were also passed making the mapping 
agencies that had already committed to the production of IMW sheets 
responsible for the production of the relevant sheets of the Map of the 
Roman Empire within their national territories.27 By 1935, eleven of the fifty 
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or so sheets had been published by Italy, Egypt, France and Great Britain, 
though momentum slowed, to Crawford’s dismay, and only one further sheet 
was published by 1940.28  
The political tensions raised by IMW-related interwar and wartime 
mapping was also revealed by the ambitious project to produce a new 54-
sheet 1:1 million atlas of Central Asia by the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, 
based on new surveys conducted during the 1927-35 Sino-Swedish 
Expedition to Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, a controversial undertaking 
involving almost forty scientists from six countries, including China, though 
the majority came from Sweden and Germany, the two countries that 
funded the expedition. This vast exercise, protected by more than 30 foot 
soldiers and transported by more than 300 camels, was described Hedin as 
a “travelling university” though it must have seem more like an invading 
army to the isolated communities through which it passed. Hedin’s 
insistence that his proposed atlas, to be based on new survey rather than 
compiled from existing cartography, would be compliant with the IMW was 
intended to reinforce the impression that his expedition was a peaceful 
exercise in international scientific collaboration.  
Although the expedition was conceived and mainly executed before the 
Nazis came to power, Hedin’s pro-German leanings meant that the 
publication of its early findings were soon embroiled in the familiar 
propaganda battles that were already beginning to undermine relationships 
between German scientists and their colleagues in other countries. This was 
notably the case in relation to the first four sheets of Hedin’s Central Asian 
atlas, all of which were published during the war in Germany by Hermann 
Haack’s renowned team of cartographers at the Justus Perthes 
Geographische Anstalt in Gotha.29 In the end, well over 50 volumes of new 
material were published based on the expedition’s findings, including 
Hedin’s atlas that finally appeared almost three decades later in 1966.30 The 
long delay was caused by US Army Map Service (AMS) which confiscated 
Hedin’s materials in 1945, aware of their enormous importance for the 
emerging Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, and only allowed 
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(and financed) the atlas when it was deemed no longer to have geostrategic 
significance.  
As Hedin’s experiences indicate, the spirit of internationalism that 
continued to adhere to the IMW was often abused by those for whom 
million-scale mapping projects had more traditional territorial and 
geopolitical objectives. During World War Two, IMW-based million-scale map 
sheets were increasingly used for planning military operations, precisely the 
opposite of what the original project was designed to achieve. The fixed sheet 
lines of the IMW and the increasing speed and mobility of warfare were 
major factors in the continued production of map series at the million-scale 
by military mapping agencies during the conflict. Million-scale series 
covering large tracts of the world were published by the Soviet Union, China, 
Great Britain, United States and Germany. Italy and Japan also published a 
limited number of such maps. The General Staff of the German Army before 
and during World War Two completed an extensive million-scale series 
called the ‘Sonderausgabe’, later titled ‘Deutsche Heereskarte’, which 
covered Europe, all of European Russia, parts of India, Africa south to the 
Congo, and the Near East.31 
  Although the Soviet Union had prepared some 1:1 million test sheets 
of its own territory as early as 1918, it was not until 1940 that the 
authorities in Moscow agreed to construct a new million-scale map of the 
entire country in 182 sheets, part of the Third Five Year Plan that was to be 
so rudely interrupted by the German invasion the following year. Despite the 
traumatic intervening events, the series was completed by 1946 and covered 
some 22.4 million square kilometres, the largest part of the world 
homogeneously mapped on the millionth scale, though the sheets remained 
classified.32    
The most extensive new 1:1 million series, however, was produced by 
the US AMS, in collaboration with GSGS in London. The AMS, established 
during World War Two, became one of the largest governmental mapping 
organizations in the world, perfectly capable of undertaking major 
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cartographic projects at all scales. After 1945, the joint AMS-GSGS 1:1 
million series proceeded apace (as AMS 1301/GSGS 4646) and finally as a 
solo American enterprise (as AMS 1301), eventually covering most of 
Eurasia, Africa, and Australia. Between 1943 and 1948, the Bureau of 
Survey in the Chinese Ministry of National Defence compiled and printed a 
1:1 million series based on the IMW format covering the whole of the 
national territory, though this too was never released (Figure 5).  
Cold War Doubts 
Despite the obvious appeal of million-scale mapping to the military mind, 
the future of the IMW in its pure form remained in serious doubt, especially 
during the immediate post-war period. Concern now focused on two specific 
themes: the role of the Central Bureau at the Ordnance Survey in 
Southampton and the growing global importance of aeronautical charts.  
The annual reports of the Central Bureau of the IMW point to a 
growing frustration at the inability of the national agencies to adhere to the 
project’s conventions.33 By 1945, only 147 of the 974 sheets (15 per cent) 
required to cover the land areas of the world had been completed. Many of 
these required revision. The specification had not been strictly enforced. The 
impossibility of ensuring consistency in the depiction of relief across all 
parts of the world had already been acknowledged but even on sheets of 
Europe the sequences of contours and colouring adopted by different 
agencies were confusing and inconsistent. Similar problems of consistency 
had already been noted in the level of detail in respect of settlements, roads, 
railways and other communication routes.34   
Attention began to focus on the role of the Central Bureau at 
Southampton. It was a purely volunteer organization that had no powers to 
enforce international agreement. Its original role was simply to coordinate 
the work of the various contributing mapping agencies and record the 
progress made by the whole project.35 The Bureau did provide feedback to 
any agency supplying proof copies of new editions and distributed the 
mandatory sixty copies that were to be sent to each contributor when a new 
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sheet was published. Procurement of IMW sheets had always been a 
problem as the Bureau had never assumed the role of agent for the sale of 
individual map sheets. Customers were advised to contact the publisher for 
the required sheet. The destruction of the Central Bureau’s records due to 
bomb damage during World War Two was the final straw. The Ordnance 
Survey itself now questioned the value of maintaining the current 
arrangements and many within the organisation recognised that this might 
be an appropriate point for a review.  
Perhaps the biggest threat to the IMW’s future, however, was the 
growing global interest in aeronautical charts. During the interwar years, 
commercial aviation had become firmly established and by the outbreak of 
World War Two the first scheduled transatlantic flights had begun. Global 
and domestic airways already provided reliable and regular services.  
Despite an intensifying demand, there was still an acute shortfall in 
aeronautical chart provision. Indeed, it had come as a shock to military 
chiefs at the outbreak of World War Two that procurement or compilation of 
aeronautical charts in the various theatres of war was severely hampered by 
a lack of adequate topographic mapping. A mere 10 per cent of the world’s 
surface had been mapped to a sufficient standard and even this small 
percentage had not been adequately revised.36 Though IMW sheets had 
previously been used as a base for aeronautical charts, they were 
increasingly seen as inadequate for this task. Human and technical 
cartographical resources were enlisted to meet the growing demand.  
During the war, the US Coast and Geodetic Survey had commenced 
work on a new and ambitious series of aeronautical charts originally 
designated as the Western Hemisphere Aeronautical Chart, later to be 
expanded into the World Aeronautical Chart (WAC) at a scale of 1:1 
million.37  International agreement on an aeronautical chart specification 
followed in late 1944 when representatives of 54 nations gathered in 
Chicago for an International Civil Aviation Conference. The International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was later established in 1947 and became 
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responsible for the publication, maintenance, and distribution of the WAC 
which became known as the ICAO series.  
The needs of aviators placed great pressure on cartographic agencies 
as member nations of ICAO were expected to keep charts falling within their 
national boundaries up to date. Indeed, the early ICAO sheets had already 
suffered from a “fixing or freezing of cartographic practice” which inevitably 
led to a rapidly accelerating obsolescence.38 Frequent revision was clearly 
critical. Understandably, the WAC series took priority over the IMW for the 
vast majority of small-scale chart production undertaken by mapping 
agencies around the world.  
The growing demand for WAC sheets and the similarity of the two 
specifications led to doubts as to whether the two series were necessary. 
However, there were important differences. The WAC had been specially 
devised to meet the requirements of visual navigation and carried only what 
was absolutely necessary for aviation and in a form particularly adapted to 
that objective. Therefore, only distinctive land, water and cultural features 
were shown. Its projection, the Lambert Conformal Conic, allowed the use of 
the uniform distance scale and showed radio ranges as straight courses. By 
comparison, the level of detail on the WAC was significantly lower than on 
the International Map and the polyconic projection of the latter did not 
possess the same special properties suited to air navigation. There were 
important differences in sheet lines. The sheet lines of the IMW were 
deliberately inflexible in order to provide a systematic coverage of the earth’s 
landmass. Each sheet covered an area 4° of latitude by 6° of longitude. 
North of latitude 60° north, and south of latitude 60° south it was 
permissible to join two or more adjoining sheets of the same latitude band.  
Most smaller countries, including Great Britain, France, Ireland and 
Finland, had publishing 1:1 million sheets that conformed to the IMW sheet 
lines alongside other sheets at the same scale that departed from IMW 
format to cover their sovereign territory more efficiently. In contrast, the 
recommended layout and numbering of sheets for the WAC was subject to 
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alterations as experience might require and as agreed as the series 
progressed. In comparison to the IMW, the WAC was an altogether more 
modern, flexible product, designed to be ‘fit-for-purpose’ with its clearly 
defined purpose (Figure 6).  
In the face of competition from the WAC, it might have been expected 
that the IMW would simply fizzle out and several commentators wondered 
whether a single global map made any sense in such brutally divided world. 
However, there was a glimmer of hope. The newly-formed United Nations, 
mindful of the IMW’s rather utopian internationalist origins, favoured 
continuing the project. The authority exercised by the UN, combined with 
the potential coordinating role of its new Cartographic Office, added weight 
to the argument that the Central Bureau of the IMW should be transferred 
to the UN. International attention could then focus on the long delayed 
completion of the IMW. However, any transfer of the IMW to the UN would 
have to be sanctioned by the International Geographical Union (IGU), the 
IGC’s successor organisation that was itself in a state of post-war disarray. 
Locating the IMW 
Although the IMW was never officially an IGU project, the project was closely 
associated with the IGC, the IGU’s precursor organisation, to which Penck 
had made his stirring original proposal in 1891. As we have noted, IMW 
progress reports were presented at all subsequent IGC events through the 
opening years of the 20th century and a statement would no doubt have 
been made to the proposed 1942 IGC in Lisbon had it not been cancelled 
due to World War Two. After 1945, the IGU attempted to revive international 
scientific relations, despite the problems of international travel and 
exchange of correspondence between executive committee members, some of 
whom had “disappeared”, and a new IMW Executive Commission was duly 
established within the IGU charged with reporting on progress at the 
delayed conference in Lisbon and in steering the project forward in the 
future.39  
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American geographers had a particular interest in this delayed event, a 
point that would later become significant in the story of the IMW. The 
American IGU National Committee, chaired by George B. Cressey, a 
prominent geographer from Syracuse University, was preparing an invitation 
to host the next IGU conference (the seventeenth in the former IGC series) in 
Washington DC in 1952. As Cressey wrote:  
it is clear that considerable initiative is now needed in order to reactivate 
Union affairs, notably with respect to the Commissions. Since it is also 
reasonably certain that the 1952 Congress will come to the United 
States, we must start plans in the near future.40  
The fact that 1952 also marked the 100th anniversary of the AGS 
provided additional incentive for an US-hosted conference as it was hoped 
that delegates from around the world would help to mark the older society’s 
centenary. The US National Committee would be the co-ordinating agency, 
with the Association of American Geographers (AAG) and the American 
Geographical Society (AGS) also heavily involved.41  
American geographers were encouraged by the IGU to suggest new 
commissions. John Kirtland Wright, the AGS’s scholarly Director, became a 
central figure in the ensuing deliberations (Figure 7).42 Wright 
enthusiastically supported the suggestion first proposed by Edward 
Espenshade from Northwestern University that the ailing IMW programme 
should be reviewed under American guidance.43 Wright suggested four new 
IGU commissions, one of which would be devoted to the IMW.44 By late 
September 1948, however, he was beginning to change his mind: “I am not 
sure whether a Commission on the Millionth Map should be proposed. As an 
international project the Millionth Map is in a parlous state. The 
headquarters at Southampton were bombed out and all the records 
destroyed”.45  
Despite Wright’s growing doubts, the US National Committee eventually 
proposed six new Commissions, listed in its Annual Report of 31 March 
1949, one of which was indeed devoted to the IMW. Given the less than 
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enthusiastic contribution of the United States to the IMW project prior to 
World War Two, it must have come as a surprise to some European 
cartographers that the American geographical establishment was belatedly 
taking an interest in this most overtly internationalist of geographical 
projects, one that had previously seemed alien to the American isolationist 
sensibilities. While such beliefs were self-evidently in decline in the changed 
post-war circumstances, there is little evidence in Wright’s correspondence 
to suggest that the cerebral geographer was seeking to secure the future of 
the IMW, still less to ensure that the United States would take on a leading 
role in the project in the future.   
As planned, the new IGU Executive Commission on the IMW was 
formally constituted at the Seventh Assembly of the IGU (the sixteenth in 
the former IGC series) Lisbon in the second week of April 1949. Wright was 
nominated and agreed to chair the Executive Commission, assisted by 
Geoffrey Cheetham, Director-General of the Ordnance Survey, and Leite de 
Castro, a geographer from University of Rio de Janeiro. By the time Wright’s 
appointment was officially confirmed by George Kimble, the IGU Secretary, 
in June 1949, Cheetham had been succeeded at the Ordnance Survey by 
the redoubtable Reginald Llewellyn Brown. The idea prominent American 
geographer might now be able to steer the IMW in a new direction, one that 
was perhaps more palatable to the interests of the United States, was 
immediately challenged by the bombastic Brown who effectively took control 
of the Commission. The forthright tone of Brown’s letters to Wright suggests 
that he had a clear agenda which he intended to fulfil with as little fuss and 
delay as humanly possible with or without his chair’s support.46 
Brown made several observations about the composition of the 
Commission, recommending that “if there are to be six official members and 
six corresponding members, it would seem to me that the six official 
members should be men of a wide outlook, while the corresponding 
members should be those concerned with particular aspects of the 1/M 
map”.47 Brown was especially keen that France should be prominently 
represented on the Commission, no doubt anxious to reinforce a more 
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traditional European perspective: “the French have played an important part 
in the production of the International 1/M Map”, he informed Wright, “so I 
would like to suggest that Monsieur Louis Hurault, the Director of the 
French Institut Geographique National, be invited to become an official 
member”.48 Wright duly agreed Hurault was immediately appointed 
alongside F. J. Alcock (Chief Curator of the National Museum of Canada in 
Ottawa) as corresponding members. Two other Europeans, Henri Gaussen 
from the University of Toulouse and Ronald Miller from the University of 
Edinburgh, were added further to reinforce the Commission’s ‘old world’ 
composition.   
No terms of reference had been laid down and Brown was equally 
determined to anxious to rectify this situation as “without these we are 
liable to grope in the dark”.49 His suggestions were again agreed by a 
compliant Wright and subsequently approved by the IGU Executive 
Committee. The Commission was to: 
1. Consider comprehensively the problem of the International Map of the 
World, 1,000,000 
2. In particular: 
a) To consider what changes, if any should be made in the Central Bureau of 
the I.M.W. 
b) To consider and advise whether the absorption or integration of the 
Central Bureau would be advantageous in the light of the following 
Resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations on 27th July 1949, under Item 45, Coordination of Cartographic 
Services of Specialized Agencies and International Organizations: Having 
noted that a number of States have expressed views in favour of the 
absorption or integration of the Central Bureau, International 1/M Map of 
the World, into the United Nations, requests the Secretary-General to 
examine the possibility of such absorption or integration in the light of the 
Council’s decision on the co-ordination of cartographic services. 
c) To ascertain what coverage at the 1/M scale exists or is in course of 
preparation, and to advise whether duplication of effort, if any, can be 
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advantageously reduced. Particular reference should be made to the 
I.C.A.O. 1/M aeronautical charts; 
d) To review the present procedure whereby each nation produces, to a 
generally agreed specification, the sheets covering a specific area, and to 
recommend whether or not any change in this procedure is worthy of 
further investigation; 
e) To reappraise the purposes for which the I.M.W. was originally created and 
to ascertain how far the present specification, including sheet layout, 
meets modern requirements, and particularly whether a base map suitable 
for carrying geographical overprints can satisfactorily be printed from the 
various existing plates; 
f) To ascertain how far the ICAO aeronautical 1/M charts can meet the 
purposes for which the IMW is produced and vice versa, and whether any 
coordination between the two maps could be affected with advantage. 
Brown made no secret of his objectives which were to ensure the 
speedy and efficient transfer of the IMW Central Bureau from the Ordnance 
Survey to the United Nations (UN), an organisation seemingly tailor-made for 
this project. At the opening session of the UN General Assembly in London 
in 1946, the national flags present at the League of Nations were replaced by 
a new flag of hope, described at the time as “a novel aerial projection of the 
world spread out from the North Pole, in gold and encircled with olive 
branches”.50  The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was 
established at the same event to co-ordinate the reconstruction of war 
devastated economies and infrastructures devastated. The ECOSOC’s 
Coordination Committee, created shortly afterwards, was designed to 
prevent the duplication and dispersion of effort among all types of 
intergovernmental organisations and had explicated including cartography 
within its brief.51  
Although Brown was keen to ensure the IMW transfer to the UN, not 
least to reduce the administrative strain the project placed on his 
overstretched organisation, he was also determined to protect the role of 
national mapping agencies in the wider project, particularly those based in 
Europe. The idea that the UN might eventually control the project, in 
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defiance of national mapping agencies, was decidedly not on Brown’s 
agenda. “[T]he existing bureau should not be handed over to some 
specialised agency of the United Nations”, he insisted, for “[o]ur object is to 
provide a single map series for many different purposes and to avoid 
duplication of effort. For this reason alone it seems that the UN should 
undertake the functions of the Bureau rather than a specialised agency, 
such as UNESCO, which will have in view only its own specialised needs”.52  
In early September 1951, the ECOSOC Committee recommended that 
the IMW Central Bureau be located within the newly established UN 
Cartographic Office, though the independent role of national mapping 
agencies was explicitly recognised and these agencies were encouraged to 
submit recommendations on the most appropriate means to ensure the 
completion of the IMW. The recommendation was passed unanimously by 
the ECOSOC council on 20th September 1951.  
Brown did not think that the adoption of the resolution would make 
the IGU Executive Commission redundant or that it would materially alter 
its duties. The Commission would no doubt expect advice on the attitude it 
should take concerning the absorption of the Central Bureau into the United 
Nations. Brown redrafted item 2(b) of the terms of reference to reflect this 
change.  
Brown wrote to Wright enclosing a personal copy of the circular letter 
he had sent as president of the Central Bureau to all those countries that 
had from time to time subscribed to the IMW inviting comment on the 
transfer of the Central Bureau to the UN.53 Responses from mapping 
agencies from all countries were unanimous and best summed up by the 
Geographer in Chief of the Belgian Congo who wrote:  
Without being critical of what was done in the past, I think the problem 
demonstrates the need for the better coordination of global mapping. We 
are of the view that it would be beneficial to entrust this kind of problem 
in future with the United Nations and a first step in the implementation 
of this idea would be to nest, as it was proposed, the Central Bureau of 
21 
 
 
the International Map at 1: 1 million scale to the mapping services of the 
United Nations.54 
The future of the IMW now seemed secure with the UN. However, the 
Commission had overlooked the ‘Tabula Imperii Romani’. Laurence Kirwan, 
Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society, wrote to Wright in May 1952 
expressing concern over the transfer of the Central Bureau and its 
responsibilities for the ‘Tabula’ to an organisation that had had no previous 
involvement in project.55 This problem was left unresolved until after the 
final report was published.    
The IMW and the World Aeronautical Chart (WAC) 
The relationship between the IMW and the WAC was a key part of the IGU 
Commission’s terms of reference. The inevitable transfer of the Central 
Bureau to the UN, an organisation that counted the ICAO as one of its 
family members, brought this issue into even sharper focus. Leite de Castro 
was to have drafted a letter to adhering countries requesting views on the 
relationship between the IMW and WAC, but he failed to do so and Brown 
and Wright were obliged to make these inquiries themselves.56 Wright 
decided to approach the main mapping authorities rather than government 
ministries as originally suggested by Brown. Wright argued that the only 
way that replies would be expected from the latter would be if the enquiries 
were sent through the US State Department and “this might make the 
procedure appear as an enterprise of the United States government which 
might in turn be somewhat prejudicial at this time”.57  
Wright’s letter referred specifically to the requirement of the 
Commission to explore the relationship of the two world map series and to 
what extent the WAC could meet the purposes of the IMW and vice versa. He 
provided an appendix summarising the differences between the two series in 
terms of projection, sheet lines, conventional signs and compilation 
materials. On Brown’s insistence, he also provided a clear steer that the 
Commission hoped to recommend that both series should be retained as 
separate but related projects. Brown is not optimistic that a unanimous 
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response would be forthcoming: “I trust you will have quick and satisfactory 
replies and that by some miracle they will all say the same thing”.58 
The miracle did not materialise as opinion on the future relationship 
of the IMW to the WAC was sharply divided. On the one hand, longstanding 
and relatively productive contributors such as Britain, France, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, and India readily agreed that it was necessary to retain 
both the IMW and the WAC. The cost of standardising the two series in 
terms of symbols and projection was simply too expensive for what little 
benefit it would ensue. On the other hand Canada, the United States and 
South Africa, countries that had severely lagged behind in terms of IMW 
map production and had invested heavily in WAC production, questioned 
the wisdom of continuing with two entirely independent products.  
By 1950, just three IMW sheets had been published by the Canadians 
and even these were in need of substantial revision. The Director of the 
Surveys and Mapping Branch for the Canadian Department of Mines and 
Resources, William H. Miller, was forthright in his response to Wright’s 
inquiry, perhaps revealing a degree of sensitivity on the subject. On the 
subject of compilation, he complained:  
whoever wrote this section has entirely lost sight of the fact that the 
production of the maps in their territory is the responsibility of the 
various sovereign states. It is entirely within the discretion of the 
adhering countries to decide whether any production will be undertaken 
and what sheets will be done first. Any discussion of the agencies 
undertaking the work within a country or the statement that ‘the 
priorities for the production of the sheets is not the same’, is out of 
place. 
In a marginal ‘note to self’ at this point in Miller’s response, Wright 
perfectly captured the essence of Miller’s message: “mind our own 
business!”. Miller’s response continued:  
Our view is very definite on the subject for the reason that we do not see 
much chance of Canada participating in the production of two entirely 
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distinct series of maps at a scale of 1/1,000,000 where differences in 
projection, sheet lines, etc., would involve two separate compilations. We 
are definitely committed to the ICAO series, and have made considerable 
progress toward complete coverage. We are preparing to produce a series 
of ground maps at 1/1,000,000 scale, using as much as possible of the 
material prepared for the air charts.59  
On the need for two separate series, the Canadians agreed that two 
series were essential in populated areas and advisable in all areas. However, 
there seemed no reason why the maps could not be so designed that one 
compilation would answer both purposes. This was of particular interest to 
Canada, as the majority of the sheets covered unpopulated areas where 
there would be relatively few differences between the two series. On the 
subject of sheet lines, it was agreed that in theory it was not essential to 
relate the sheet layouts of the two series. But from a practical point of view 
the Canadians saw little prospect of them participating in the production of 
an IMW series for a long time unless they were related. The WAC projection 
was not viewed as so unsuitable for the IMW and there were severe doubts 
as to whether it mattered anyway as it was mostly a ‘theoretical issue’. 
According to Miller:  
The amount of work involved in interchanging material between the two 
projections would be more than we could undertake for the foreseeable 
future.60 
The United States had agreed to the original resolutions adopted by the 
IGC in 1908 and the USGS was responsible for 42 sheets designed to cover 
continental United States. By 1950 only nine of the sheets had been 
published. Thomas S. Nolan, Acting Director of the USGS, pointed out that 
US military agencies had formally adopted a 1:1 million scale layout for the 
WAC series in respect of all Department of the Army Maps of that scale.61 In 
view of this, and mindful that a complete national coverage was now 
provided by the WAC, Nolan openly questioned the necessity of the IMW 
series. The USGS was re-examining the justification for continuing the 
“small program” of compiling the IMW maps of the United States, Nolan 
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observed, and the programme had been suspended pending increased 
demand for the IMW series.  
It had appeared that many government requirements for 1/1,000,000 
scale geographical maps might possibly be met by the World 
Aeronautical Charts which, for the past several years, have afforded 
complete and reasonably up-to-date coverage. As these are maintained 
at government expense, we have felt that the question of also continuing 
the IMW series should be rather carefully considered. Judging from our 
IMW map sales, and other very general indications, the demand for these 
maps in recent years has been rather limited except for the military 
uses. Of course it is recognised that this would probably be otherwise if 
a complete and maintained series, such as the WAC now affords, were 
available.62  
In these circumstances, USGS was happy that the IGU Commission 
had recommended the need for the two series as set out in the appendix to 
their letter as this “dispelled some of our misgivings concerning the 
justifications for continuing the compilation and printing of the IMW sheets 
of United States.” However, no future commitment to IMW production was 
provided. 
As South Africa had maintained million-scale aeronautical charts 
covering the whole of Africa south of latitude 19° 20 minutes in seven 
sheets, revised as recently as 1948-49, and boasted a 22-sheet 1:500,000 
topographical map series covering the entire country which had been 
published between 1947 and 1951, the Union’s Department of External 
Affairs provided a firm response to Wright’s enquiry:  
The views of the government of the Union of South Africa are that, in 
southern Africa, the production of two 1/1M series is quite unnecessary. 
The Union government is of the opinion that the sheet lines and 
projection of the WAC series should be adopted for both series.63 
The South Africans also provided a practical solution where symbols of 
both series could be brought more nearly into line. In areas where both 
series may be necessary, IMW production could easily be created through 
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conversion of the WAC series through the omission of the aeronautical 
symbol plate, the addition of a black plate for further names in detail, and 
the substitution of another road plate. Indeed the South African opinion was 
that “the conclusions noted in the Appendix to your letter are, in most 
cases, not acceptable.” On the subject of sheet lines, opinion was also quite 
clear.  
Seeing that the IMW sheet lines consist of meridians and parallels set 
out in 6° by 4° intervals starting from the intersection of the Greenwich 
Meridian with the Equator and entirely disregarding the shape of the 
land masses, it cannot be agreed that the WAC layout ‘would be 
detrimental to the general uses of the geographical map’… Both the IMW 
and the WAC sheet lines are unsuited to air navigation in southern 
Africa. Any international series generally suits the world after a fashion 
and does not necessarily suit any particular country. The WAC sheet 
lines endeavour to minimise the number of sheets required but, by the 
universal law of sheer cussedness, they lie as unfavourably relative to 
the national air routes as possible and produce the maximum number of 
cases where three or four sheets join on an air route.  
Where sheet lines were concerned, both IMW and WAC suited the countries 
of the world equally well or equally badly. If the two series were on the same 
sheet lines and projection, and if a genuine effort were made to bring the 
symbols into line, it would be possible to convert WAC to IMW in areas 
where both series may be necessary.  
Australia had published just nine IMW sheets, most of which required 
considerable revision. B. P. Lambert, the Australian Deputy Director of 
National Mapping, shared the misgivings of his Americans, Canadians and 
South African colleagues. Much effort had been invested in the production of 
aeronautical charts even prior to the establishment of the WAC series and 
he viewed the future of the IMW with some scepticism. Lambert summarised 
his reservations as follows: “It is thought that whilst there exists a definite 
need for the International Map of the World, the demand will be reduced 
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considerably when sheets of the World Aeronautical Chart ICAO 1:1,000,000 
become available”.64 
Even those countries that wished to maintain the WAC and IMW as 
separate series felt that improvements could be made to the IMW sheet 
lines. Several countries, such as Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, New 
Zealand and Norway had found it necessary to publish sheets in the IMW 
style but on special sheet lines in view of the inappropriate incidence of the 
standard sheet lines in their area of responsibility. Colonel N. MacNeill, the 
Assistant Director of the Ordnance Survey of Ireland, complained that a 
comparatively small country such as Ireland should be able to secure 
agreement to show the whole of its national territory on a single sheet. 
MacNeill pointed out that the ICAO Map Division had agreed to a re-
alignment of the sheet lines for the Irish WAC sheet.65  
Though a standard sheet size was essential, the Ordnance Survey also 
felt that it was important to have some flexibility in dealing with special 
cases and depart from the standard size by adding extensions or introducing 
overlaps in cases where this would improve the layout of the sheets. The 
Ordnance Survey suggested that an improvement in the sheet layout in 
certain areas would add considerable incentive to the production of maps in 
that area and Great Britain was a case in point.66 Future publication of 
standard IMW sheets by the Ordnance Survey was prevented for the 
foreseeable future by the destruction of all the reprographic materials during 
World War Two.67 However, the materials for Sheets 1 and 2 of the million-
scale map of Britain with specially design sheet lines had survived.68  
Nor were respondents altogether happy with the original specification 
of 1913. The Surveyor General of Egypt took the opportunity to criticise the 
method of relief depiction, complaining in particular about the use of the 
colour green in depicting altitude. Although this colour was often used to 
represent low lying areas, it was “invariably associated with fertile 
cultivation or natural growth” and its use in maps of Egypt and many other 
arid areas “created an erroneous impression”.69 On the other hand, the 
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Survey of India was adamant that its specification and use of hypsometric 
tints and contours should be adopted by the IMW. This was not presented in 
the spirit of improving the specification but simply as a far preferable system 
which would save the Survey the cost of preparing new plates for the IMW.70     
Though official USGS contributions had been disappointingly slow, 
the US AMS million-scale aeronautical chart production had made an 
impact on the mapping of Central America. For example, Guatemalan 
involvement in the project was made redundant due to the AMS providing 
million-scale aeronautical charts using trimetrogon photography. To many 
smaller Central American countries, the IMW was an irrelevance.    
Responses from many other countries were brief but clear. The Danes 
had suspended work in its IMW sheets of Iceland and Greenland, pending 
the outcome of deliberations regarding the future of the ICAO series and the 
IMW. The Finns were similarly non-committal, describing their IMW sheets 
as “antiquated”. The Director General, Väinò Seppälä, stated that “it would 
be very unwise for us to re-edit our sheets before a definite new program on 
United Nations lines has been generally accepted”. He echoed many by 
writing that “the whole project is open to international discussion”.71  
Final Judgements 
Clearly there was considerable difference of opinion on the questions of 
sheet lines, projections, conventional signs and particularly on the need for 
a separate series. Though the responses were, without exception, driven by 
self-interest, Wright began his summary of the replies by pointing out that 
at least “not a single one has advocated abandoning the IMW”.72   
Brown admitted the only thing the IGU Commission could do in its final 
report was:  
repeat the substance of the final paragraph of your Third Report. Short 
of laying down the law ourselves, which I think would be difficult and 
would almost certainly be unacceptable, that is about all we can usefully 
do. If the suggested conference were to be held the representatives of 
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each nation would then have a fairly good idea of the points of view held 
by other nations and the conference should have some chance of 
reaching agreement.73  
Wright duly wrote a draft report which he enclosed with his letter of 10 
April 1952. Brown was unimpressed "I am not at all happy about this 
report”, he wrote:  
[it] leaves me with the impression that the Commission did practically 
nothing, whereas in fact we really did a great deal though we have not by 
any means solved the problems that were set in the terms of reference.74 
Brown reminded Wright that he had sent a paper on each of the items 
2(a), 2(b), and 2(d) of the original terms of reference and that Hurault had 
also communicated his views in a paper on item 2 (e). As these papers had 
been circulated to the Commission, Brown worried that Wright was ignoring 
important evidence of progress. He also objected to Wright’s statement that 
“items 2(a) and (b) were treated primarily by Gen. Brown” as every member 
of the Commission had seen and many had commented on these papers. He 
suggested that the report should state the Commission’s conclusions rather 
than infer that they were those of a particular individual.  
Brown also recommended that Wright should include, as an appendix, 
the paper he had previously written to help Wright with his enquiry about 
the relationship of the IMW to the WAC, continuing that: 
it is, of course, clear to us that we have not been able to answer the 
questions posed in the terms of reference. This I believe to be due partly 
to the differences within the Commission itself, which are perhaps not 
very severe, but more particularly to the great differences of opinion 
among the various nations who are interested in IMW as revealed in the 
replies to Enquiries I and II. I think we ought to say more categorically 
that that is a reason for not providing answers to the questions and that 
that also is our reason for recommending an international conference be 
called. 
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As to the future of the Commission, Brown agreed that the Commission 
had done all it usefully could do and “that we do not recommend its 
continuance.” He further suggested that the report should be worded so as 
to recommend further consideration be given to these problems after the 
Central Bureau was transferred to the UN. 
Brown disagreed with the remarks regarding the financing of the 
project proposed by Hurault. As far as Brown was concerned, the IMW was a 
co-operative undertaking and the Central Bureau had no technical or 
administrative functions and was certainly not concerned with financing the 
project. In his opinion:  
if those countries whose territorial and financial positions make the 
undertaking difficult for them are financed by the others, it will soon lose 
its cooperative nature and may also lose its international character." 
Brown preferred that the Commission ought to draw attention to the 
need to investigate the financing of the map and recommend that the 
countries be invited to send representatives to a proposed conference to 
consider the problem of financing the IMW. 
In conclusion, Brown noted that:  
I am afraid you may think I have done some violence to the draft report 
which I am sure you must have taken a lot of trouble to compile but in 
its present form I would not feel at all happy for it to be presented to 
I.G.U. It certainly reveals the fact that we have not provided the answers 
that the terms of reference had asked for, and while this is quite true, it 
has done so nakedly as to make it also appear that the Commission has 
given no thought to the matter at all. This is far from being the fact. 
Wright dutifully redrafted the report in response to Brown’s forthright 
criticisms. In a letter of 4 June 1952, Brown thanked Wright for his efforts: 
“I'm so glad you have taken my comments on your original draft in the spirit 
in which they were intended and that you have made such a good job of 
redrafting the report. I am very sorry to have thrown this extra work on you 
just at a time when you were so heavily engaged with the celebration of the 
100th anniversary of the AGS. I hope that all went off well.” On the issue of 
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whether to include all the appendices Brown now felt that the “report as now 
drafted it is perfectly readable without them.” 
By November 1951, Wright felt that the Commission had done all it 
could. “We have made a reconnaissance, and arrived at certain general 
conclusions that I believe are of value, but I don’t see how we can pursue 
the matter further regarding points of technical detail. These will have to be 
ironed out much more carefully at a meeting of representatives of the 
agencies concerned.”75 Wright was unable to present the report to the IGU 
meeting at the Statler Hotel, Washington on 11 August 1952 due to illness, 
and Brown, no doubt relishing the opportunity, presided over the 
proceedings in his absence. The Commission recommended no change to 
the present system whereby each nation was responsible for the production 
of maps covering its own territory, and conforming generally to the 
specifications as laid down in 1913. The Commission also recommended 
that both the IMW and the WAC should be retained as necessary and 
mutually sustaining programmes. However, the wide differences of opinion 
within the international community on technical and other matters had 
convinced the Commission that the IMW’s many problems could only be 
resolved by personal, face-to-face discussion between representatives of 
interested governments under the auspices of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations. 
In the end, this decision had little impact on the IMW which was 
already a relatively moribund project, its fate sealed by the very national 
rivalries and suspicions it was designed to diminish. Just as Penck’s 
utopian internationalism had to be tempered by the realities of negotiating 
with official mapping agencies, so Wright had confronted the harsh realities 
of dealing with hard-pressed post-war professional map makers operating 
within the context of an emerging Cold War ideological division of the globe.  
Eventually, a UN Technical Conference was organised in Bonn in 
August 1962 to revitalise the IMW. An impressive exhibition on the history 
of the project was organised,76 as well as the publication of a detailed 
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bibliography.77 The conference agreed to amend the specifications in various 
ways, notably in relation to relief depiction and symbols, and to adopt the 
Lambert conformal conic projection in compliance with the World 
Aeronautical Chart.78 The annual reports on the IMW, published through 
the remainder of the 1960s by the UN’s Department of Technical 
Cooperation for Development, bear witness to the resolute efforts made to 
continue the project including further revision of the relief depiction.79 
The IMW’s many critics remained unimpressed. The renowned 
American cartographer Arthur Robinson described the IMW as no more than 
‘cartographic wallpaper’.80 Only a handful of new editions were released 
through the early 1970s, with the result that the IMW could no longer be 
regarded as an active international series. In 1989, a UNESCO report 
concluded that continuation of the IMW was no longer worthwhile as most 
nation states had long since ceased production under this programme.81   
Conclusion 
Reading through the responses to the IGU Commission one senses the 
reluctance on the part of all IMW contributors to throw in the towel and 
admit defeat. Perhaps there is an element of denial or even sentimental 
attachment to it. To unilaterally withdraw from the project would represent 
abandonment of post-war rapprochement and what remained of the utopian 
ideals of the International Map.  
The twentieth century got the International Map it deserved. Foreign 
policy, dominated by self-interest, had an overriding impact on the project. 
This was inevitable given its over-reliance on national mapping agencies that 
were so inextricably tied to foreign policy. For example, just as the virtual 
withdrawal of the United States from the project during the inter-war period 
mirrored its attitude to the League of Nations, its post-war revival of interest 
in the IGU and the IMW paralleled its central role in support for the UN. 
Similarly, the end of European empires, arguably the most revolutionary 
change in world politics after 1945, had an enormous impact on the 
project.82 The colonialism to which Penck had appealed during its formative 
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years had been replaced by a new world order. Britain, so central to the 
original negotiations, now wished to relinquish its administrative 
responsibilities. If the IMW was to survive then its future would be more 
secure within the auspices of the UN. Fortunately for the IMW, the UN 
recognised the symbolic and practical importance of the project.83 
Blame for the failings of the IMW should not rest solely with national 
mapping agencies and their governments. Rivalries, jealousies and other 
human failings contributed too, as illustrated by the trials and tribulations 
of the ‘Tabula Imperii Romani’. To supporters of the International Map, the 
‘Tabula’ exemplified all that was good about the IMW – an ideal topographic 
base for new academic research, designed quite explicitly to ensure that the 
classical world remained an inspirational scholarly resource for all 
countries, not just those who were best able by location or resources to 
control the creation of archaeological knowledge. In his review of two new 
sheets published in 1954, the programme’s idealistic champion, O. G. S. 
Crawford, could not conceal his bitter disappointment. In his view, the 
project in its original form was now “completely and irrevocably dead”.84 
Among the causes of death were the “absurd national jealousies” that 
prevented archaeologists in one country from collaborating with those of 
another and the general “cartographical ignorance of the archaeologists and 
the apathy of them and their Survey Departments” which meant that “no 
field-work had been done; it was all armchair work.” 85 Crawford’s 
characteristically forthright criticisms reveal another underlying weakness of 
the IMW and its associated projects. If the IMW was to serve as a base map 
for academic research, it needed contributors that political motivations, 
intellectual energy and technical skills that Crawford possessed. It would 
appear he was in a very small minority indeed. Given the evidence presented 
above, Norman Thrower’s comment that “through all the vicissitudes of the 
twentieth century, the IMW has been a vehicle for international cooperation, 
if not an unqualified cartographic success” is perhaps a little generous.86  
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